Say It on Time: Florida Caselaw, Week of October 23, 2026

In two thousand six, Broward County charged a man with first-degree murder and armed robbery, for the robbery of a pawn shop twelve years earlier. A jury convicted him, and he was sentenced to death.

Three years later, the Florida Supreme Court reversed and ordered a judgment of acquittal, because the evidence at trial was legally insufficient to support the convictions. But under the law at the time, he couldn’t seek compensation for the years he’d spent locked up.

On July first, twenty twenty-five, the Legislature changed that law. Three weeks later, he filed his petition. The circuit court denied it. This week, the State confessed error, and the Fourth District sent it back.

I’m Rory Safir, and this is Reasonably Safir.

This one is the caselaw edition: the decisions Florida’s appellate courts handed down this week, case by case, for the lawyers who’d rather hear them than read them.

Here’s the thing about this week. Over and over, the question was whether a party made its point in time and in the right form. A sworn petition the trial court never looked at. An objection to a translated confession that came after the same evidence was already in. A constitutional claim about jury size that arrived in a supplemental brief. So that’s the theme. Say it on time. Let’s get into it.

The first case is the one I opened with. Lindsey against the State, Fourth District, out of Broward County, Judge Barbara Duffy below. Judge Shaw wrote it, with Judges Forst and Shepherd.

Herman Lindsey’s two thousand nine acquittal came from the Florida Supreme Court itself, and the compensation statute, chapter nine sixty-one, kept him out for sixteen years. The twenty twenty-five amendments may have opened a door. Section 961.03 now sets a deadline of July first, twenty twenty-seven, for a group of people shut out before by the old ninety-day timing rule or by an unrelated prior felony. That group is people whose convictions were vacated between two thousand six and July twenty twenty-five, with the charges dismissed or an acquittal on retrial. Whether an acquittal ordered by the Supreme Court fits language written for dismissals and retrial acquittals is one of the questions the trial court now has to answer.

Lindsey’s first petition wasn’t under oath, and the State attacked it on that, on timeliness, and on the evidence of innocence. So he filed an amended petition, sworn, with additional evidence, and pointed to the new deadline. The circuit court denied relief anyway, relying on the same arguments the State had made against the first petition, and apparently ignoring the sworn amended one. On appeal, the State conceded that the circuit court didn’t follow the procedures section 961.03 requires. The Fourth District accepted the confession of error, reversed, and remanded for the circuit court to follow them. It didn’t reach Lindsey’s argument that the court should expand the definition of a wrongfully incarcerated person. So what Lindsey won is a new hearing, not a compensation award.

For practice: if you have a former client whose conviction was vacated in the last twenty years and who was told they couldn’t get compensation, look at the twenty twenty-five amendments now. They may or may not fit, so read the eligibility language closely. The deadline for that group is July first, twenty twenty-seven. File it sworn the first time, because the oath was the first thing the State attacked in Lindsey.

Quick pause, colleague to colleague. My firm handles DUI, criminal defense, and personal injury across Tampa Bay. If a case walks through your door that you’d rather send out, call or text 727-472-8096. I gladly accept referrals.

The next case is Torres against the State, Fourth District, out of Palm Beach County, Judge James Nutt below. Judge Levine wrote it, with Judges Klingensmith and Lott. It’s about a confession that came through an interpreter.

Torres was charged with aggravated battery with a knife. After his arrest, a sergeant interviewed him, with a community service officer interpreting from Spanish. She wasn’t a certified interpreter. At trial, she testified, without objection, that he admitted the stabbing during the recorded interview, and that she translated word for word, in her words, “for the most part.” Torres took the stand and denied confessing. Then the State offered the video of the interview, and the defense objected that a translation by an uncertified interpreter violated due process.

The Fourth District affirmed on both grounds. Due process doesn’t require a certified interpreter for a police interview. The court followed a Tenth Circuit decision and said certification may be best practice, but the Constitution doesn’t require it. And admitting the video wasn’t an abuse of discretion, because the safeguards from the court’s own Fernandez decision were there: the interpreter had no investigative role, the recording was available to the defense before trial, and nothing showed bias. The court contrasted its Mendez-Martinez decision, where the translator was the lead investigator and translated the video for the first time on the witness stand. And in a footnote, the court noted that section 90.606, the interpreter oath statute, governs interpreters in judicial proceedings, not a pretrial police interview.

Two things for your files. First, look at footnote three. Because the interpreter had already testified about the admissions without objection, the court said Torres may have waived any objection to the video carrying the same statements. If you’re going to fight a translation, fight it the first time it comes in, and file a motion in limine so you aren’t objecting in front of the jury. Second, Mendez-Martinez is your model. Get your own certified translation of the recording before trial, and if the State’s translator is part of the investigation, or hasn’t produced a translation before trial, say so on the record.

And a citation affirmance from the Sixth District the same week, Guzman, out of Collier County, cites the Florida Supreme Court for a related rule: partial inaudibility isn’t a ground to exclude a recording if the audible parts are relevant, authenticated and otherwise admissible.

The next case is Wilson against the State, Second District, out of Pinellas County, Judge Philip Federico below. I practice in Pinellas, so this one’s close to home. Judge Silberman wrote it, with Chief Judge Lucas and Judge Smith.

Wilson was charged with sex offenses against a developmentally disabled adult. He was convicted of battery as a lesser included offense, acquitted of the rest, and sentenced to ten years as a habitual felony offender. Two issues get written treatment.

First, the victim testified holding a teddy bear, over objection. The court found no Florida case on point, pointed to decisions from other states allowing comfort items, and relied on section 92.55(5), which lets a trial court set conditions it finds just and appropriate when a person with an intellectual disability testifies in a sexual offense case. No abuse of discretion.

Second, the six-person jury. After briefing was done, and after the U.S. Supreme Court granted review in Kian, Wilson got leave to file a supplemental brief arguing that section 913.10, which provides six jurors for noncapital criminal cases, is unconstitutional. He hadn’t raised it at trial. The Second District said that under existing law there was no fundamental error, and that it’s bound by Williams against Florida. Affirmed.

If Kian comes out the other way, Wilson’s case shows who may be left out: the defendants who never objected. The deep dive at the end is about exactly that. Hold that thought.

One more on the criminal side, and it’s about the same problem from a different angle. Estrada against the State, First District, out of Hamilton County, Judge Melissa Olin below. Judge Ray wrote it, with Judges Lewis and M.K. Thomas. A sex offense conviction with a habitual felony offender sentence, which the defendant challenged under the Supreme Court’s Erlinger decision, arguing a jury had to find the habitual offender facts.

He never asked for a jury on those facts and never objected at sentencing. He raised it for the first time in a rule 3.800(b) motion while the appeal was pending. The First District held that doesn’t preserve it. A claim that a jury rather than a judge had to make the findings attacks the sentencing process, not the sentencing order, so it needs a contemporaneous objection. And even if preserved, any error was harmless, because the certified judgments, fingerprints and release records left nothing a rational jury could have found differently. The court didn’t decide whether Erlinger actually requires a jury there.

The same opinion held that the cost of electronic monitoring on probation doesn’t have to be orally pronounced, because sections 948.11 and 948.09 make payment a statutory consequence of the monitoring. The court noted the Second District’s Lavender decision went the other way without addressing those statutes.

Pair this with Scott from last episode, where the Third District certified conflict on reoffender sentences after a probation violation. If your client faces an enhancement that turns on facts like prior convictions and release dates, object at sentencing and ask for a jury, in so many words. In the First District, a rule 3.800(b) motion won’t save it.

A few short ones to finish the criminal side.

Farney against the State, Sixth District, out of Orange County. A citation affirmance with one message: a claim that a plea was involuntary has to be preserved by a motion to withdraw the plea, even when the error is said to be fundamental.

Gerding against the State, Fifth District, out of Hernando County. A summary denial of a postconviction motion was reversed on the claim that trial counsel misadvised the defendant about how much time he’d get by pleading. The court sent it back for records that conclusively refute the claim, or an evidentiary hearing.

And Wilder against the State, Third District, out of Monroe County. A petition for certiorari was dismissed, citing cases holding that the denial of a defense continuance can be reviewed on plenary appeal, and that certiorari requires far more than legal error. If a continuance ruling matters, make your record for the appeal.

Now the injury side, and it’s all about the punitive damages motion.

First, Broward Care at Home against Shook, Fourth District, out of Broward County. The trial court let the plaintiff amend to add punitive damages. Reversed, in one paragraph: rule 1.190 requires the proposed amended pleading to be attached to the motion and served at least twenty days before the hearing. The plaintiff didn’t attach it, and filed it seven days before the hearing. Calendar the twenty days, and attach the pleading.

Second, a follow-up from episode eleven. Limousines of South Florida against Levit, Third District, out of Miami-Dade. We covered the original opinion, where the court reversed leave to add punitive damages against a shuttle company whose driver may have lacked a passenger endorsement. This week the court denied rehearing and the request to certify questions of great public importance, and substituted a new opinion, with the same result. A licensing violation, standing alone, still isn’t enough. You need conduct that rises to gross negligence and a link between that conduct and the harm.

And one for anyone collecting a judgment against an insurer. Citizens against Weber, Third District. The court affirmed a contingency fee multiplier, but the final judgment fixed post-judgment interest at one rate until paid, and section 55.03(3) says the rate adjusts every January first. Check that line in your proposed judgment.

One more thing before I let you go, because ten minutes of holdings is a digest, and this show doesn’t do digests. Every Friday this segment takes the one doctrine the week actually turned on and gets into the deep end. This week it’s the six-person jury: what the U.S. Supreme Court is reviewing in Kian, and which of your clients might benefit if the Court rules for the defendant.

Start with the text. Article one, section twenty-two of the Florida Constitution says the number of jurors, not fewer than six, shall be fixed by law. Section 913.10 fixes it: twelve for capital cases, and six for all other criminal cases. That has been Florida’s rule for noncapital cases for a very long time.

Now the federal side. In nineteen seventy, in Williams against Florida, the Supreme Court held that the twelve-person panel is not a necessary ingredient of trial by jury, and that Florida’s six-person jury didn’t violate the Sixth Amendment. In nineteen seventy-eight, in Ballew against Georgia, the Court drew a floor: five jurors in a nonpetty criminal case is too few. Then in twenty twenty, in Ramos against Louisiana, the Court held that a state jury must be unanimous to convict of a serious offense, and threw out an old precedent that had allowed otherwise.

In June of this year, the Court granted certiorari in Kian against Florida. The Fourth District had affirmed Kian without an opinion. The question in the petition is whether he was deprived of his right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to a trial by a twelve-person jury when charged with a serious felony. Nobody knows how the Court will rule, and I’m not going to guess.

What we can talk about is who would benefit if Kian wins. Under Griffith against Kentucky, from nineteen eighty-seven, a new rule for criminal prosecutions applies to all cases pending on direct review or not yet final. The Florida Supreme Court adopted the same approach for its own decisions in Smith against the State, in nineteen ninety-two, with a condition that matters here: to benefit from a change in the law, the defendant must have timely objected at trial if an objection was required to preserve the issue. And on the other end, in Edwards against Vannoy in twenty twenty-one, the Supreme Court held that the Ramos unanimity rule doesn’t apply retroactively on federal collateral review.

Now look at what the district courts are already doing. In Rogers, the Sixth District in June denied a defendant’s request to add a Kian argument by supplemental brief, because he never raised jury size at trial or in his initial brief. The court called claims built on a cert grant speculative and premature, and noted that even if Kian wins, there are open questions about whether the error is structural or subject to harmless error review, and about retroactivity. Wilson, this week, said the same thing in a Pinellas case: no objection, no fundamental error, affirmed.

And one limit DUI lawyers need. Kian’s question is about a serious felony. In Blanton against North Las Vegas, in nineteen eighty-nine, the Supreme Court presumed that an offense with a maximum of six months is petty for Sixth Amendment purposes, and held that a Nevada DUI defendant had no federal right to a jury trial at all. In Florida, a basic first DUI conviction carries not more than six months. So don’t expect Kian to change a first-offense DUI trial in county court. A third DUI within ten years, or a fourth regardless of when the priors happened, is a third-degree felony under section 316.193, and that’s where the question is live.

So here’s the working playbook.

First, object to a six-person jury in every felony trial, in writing, before jury selection starts. Ask for twelve, cite the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and cite the Kian cert grant. Smith says the objection is what keeps your client in line for the benefit of a change in the law. It doesn’t promise relief.

Second, get a ruling. Make sure the judge actually denies the request on the record, so nobody can argue later that you acquiesced in six.

Third, raise it in the initial brief on appeal. Rogers and Wilson both turned away defendants who tried to add it later. Argue it as preserved error, and argue fundamental error in the alternative.

Fourth, know where each client’s case sits. Griffith protects cases on direct review or not yet final. After a case is final, Edwards suggests federal collateral relief from a new jury rule is unlikely, so a client whose appeal is pending is in a very different position from one whose case closed last year.

Fifth, sort your caseload by charge. For felonies, including felony DUI, preserve it every time. For a basic first-offense misdemeanor DUI, remember Blanton before you spend your credibility on it.

And the limit, stated plainly. Williams is still the law, and every Florida court is bound by it until the Supreme Court says otherwise. Kian may come out either way, and even a win could come with a harmless error analysis that limits who gets a new trial. The objection costs you nothing. Missing it may cost your client the benefit of the decision.

If you want the set, Williams, Ballew, Blanton, Griffith, Smith, Rogers and Wilson, plus a one-page written objection to a six-person jury built on those five steps, email me and I’ll send them over.

So that’s the week. A former death row defendant who finally gets his compensation petition heard, because the trial court skipped the procedure the statute requires. A translated confession that came in, and a footnote about objecting the first time. A teddy bear on the witness stand, and a six-person jury challenge that came too late. An Erlinger claim that needed an objection at sentencing. On the injury side, two punitive damages amendments reversed, one on a twenty-day rule and one on the merits, and a reminder about post-judgment interest.

The pattern, if you want one: in almost every case, the winning or losing move happened before the appeal was ever filed. Make the record when it counts.

One caveat, colleague to colleague. These are summaries, most of these decisions aren’t final until the rehearing window runs, and nothing in this episode is legal advice. Pull the opinion before you rely on a word of it.

If you want any of this week’s opinions, or the six-person jury objection from the deep dive, email me at Rory at the Safir lawyer dot com and I’ll send them over.

Take care of yourself, and take care of your clients.