In Brief
On October 2, 2026, Florida’s Fifth District Court of Appeal threw out a Clay County man’s two convictions for resisting an officer without violence and ordered a judgment of acquittal. Deputies held him because he matched a 911 caller’s short description of a man trying her doorknob. The court said a match on innocent details like hair and clothing, with nothing else pointing to a crime, didn’t give them reasonable suspicion to detain him, so they weren’t lawfully executing a legal duty. The decision binds Florida trial courts statewide unless the home district has ruled differently.
Robert William Holliday had lived in the same Clay County apartment complex for about seven years. Around 5 a.m. one morning in August 2023, he was out with a boa constrictor and a ball python draped around his neck and shoulders when three or four deputies circled him. Another resident had called 911 about a man trying to open her door, and Holliday matched her description. The deputies told him he wasn’t free to leave. He swore at them and tried to walk away, a deputy tased him, and a county judge later convicted him of two counts of resisting an officer without violence.
On October 2, 2026, the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed both convictions and sent the case back for a judgment of acquittal, a ruling that the evidence couldn’t support a guilty verdict. Holliday v. State, No. 5D2024-1865, slip op. at 9 (Fla. 5th DCA Oct. 2, 2026). The deputies had a description and nothing more, and that wasn’t enough to hold him.
On This Page
What Happened Outside the Apartment
The caller told the dispatcher she was watching the man on her Ring doorbell camera. Her description gave his race, his dreadlocks, a black T-shirt and red pants. One deputy agreed that was all of it: no height, weight or age.
Holliday walked toward the deputies on his own. He wasn’t running, out of breath or sweating, and he wasn’t carrying tools. He said he was taking his snakes to the pond. The deputies told him he matched the description and “that he was not free to leave.” Slip op. at 3. He tried to walk off, deputies testified he tried to push past one of them, and a deputy tased him. “The entire encounter lasted only five minutes and thirty-six seconds.” Id.
The Ring clips the caller later handed over didn’t show Holliday touching her doorknob, and the deputies hadn’t watched the footage before they stopped him. Id. at 3-4. He was never arrested or charged for attempted burglary, and the State dropped a loitering or prowling count. Id. at 4 & n.8. At a June 2024 bench trial, meaning a judge and no jury, the judge called the stop “well-founded,” found him guilty of resisting, and withheld adjudication, which stops short of formally adjudicating a person guilty. Id. at 4.
What the Court Held
Resisting without violence, section 843.02, Florida Statutes, has two elements: “(1) the officer was engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty and (2) the defendant’s action constituted obstruction or resistance of that lawful duty.” Slip op. at 5 (quoting Tellam v. State, 373 So. 3d 345, 347 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023)). The first element turns on the Fourth Amendment, the constitutional limit on searches and seizures. An officer who holds someone, even briefly, needs reasonable suspicion: specific facts suggesting the person “has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.” Id. (quoting Fields v. State, 292 So. 3d 889, 893 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020)). It’s a lower bar than probable cause, but a hunch doesn’t clear it.
Nobody disputed that Holliday was detained once deputies surrounded him and told him he couldn’t leave. Id. at 7. Judge Makar, joined by Judges Wallis and Edwards, held that the 911 call on its own “did not form a reasonable suspicion to detain Holliday.” Id. at 8. The opinion’s last section draws the line plainly: “The officers were entitled to attempt to question Holliday, but not to detain or physically seize him.” Id. at 9.
Why the Description Wasn’t Enough
A citizen who reports a crime is treated as more reliable than an anonymous tipster. Slip op. at 6 (citing Baptiste v. State, 995 So. 2d 285, 291 (Fla. 2008)). The court accepted that, but a tip has to be reliable “in its assertion of illegality,” and not only in describing a person. Id. at 7 (quoting Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000)).
The deputies did no checking before they detained him. Id. at 8. Holliday came to them, calm and carrying no tools, and the snakes, which the caller never mentioned, cut against the burglary theory. The court’s footnote says they “would add an unnecessary challenge to even the most experienced burglar.” Id. at 7-8 n.11.
The court relied on a 1988 First District case. Confirming “innocent details of identification” helps show officers found the right person, but it doesn’t “create or support a suspicion that crime is afoot.” Id. at 8 (quoting R.E. v. State, 536 So. 2d 1125, 1128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)). Hair and clothing told the deputies who Holliday was. They didn’t tell them he’d done anything.
What It Changes, and Its Limits
The Florida Supreme Court has held that “in the absence of interdistrict conflict, district court decisions bind all Florida trial courts.” Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1992). So a county judge in Hillsborough County is bound by Holliday unless the Second District has decided the question differently, and the opinion itself relies on Second District cases pointing the same way. The decision isn’t final until any timely rehearing motion is resolved.
It has three real limits. First, it’s about resisting without violence. Since June 16, 2026, under chapter 2026-144, Laws of Florida, the felony of resisting with violence, section 843.01, no longer says “lawful execution of any legal duty.” It now covers an officer “engaged in the performance of his or her official duties as described in s. 943.10.” Section 843.02 still uses the lawful-duty language. Second, section 776.051 says a person “is not justified in the use or threatened use of force to resist any arrest or detention by a law enforcement officer” acting in good faith. Third, it turns on facts. A detailed description, a fresh report, or anything officers saw that pointed to a crime could change the answer.
Holliday won his appeal more than three years after the tasing and the arrest. The safer course in the moment is to stay calm, keep your hands still and argue about the stop later, in court.
Where the Defense Is
In a resisting case, the State has to prove the officer was acting lawfully, and that’s where Holliday was won. The work is in pinning down two things.
The first is the moment of seizure. What did the officer say, how many officers were there, and did anyone block the way out? “You’re not free to leave” is usually the clearest marker. My page on reasonable suspicion in Florida covers what counts.
The second is what the officers actually knew at that moment, measured then and not after. That comes from the 911 recording, the dispatch notes, the radio traffic and the body camera. Put the description side by side with the person and list what was missing. In Holliday, even the trial judge noted that what officers learned later “doesn’t come into play.” Slip op. at 4 n.7. The deputies hadn’t watched the Ring video before stopping him, so it couldn’t help them.
The lawfulness question can be raised by a motion for judgment of acquittal at trial, as it was here, or by a motion to suppress if evidence came out of the detention. My page on battery on an officer and resisting arrest walks through both resisting statutes, and what the Officer Jason Raynor Act changed covers the June 2026 rewrite.
Common Questions
Can police detain you in Florida just because you match a description?
Not on a bare match. In Holliday v. State (Fla. 5th DCA Oct. 2, 2026), a match on innocent details from a 911 call, with nothing else suggesting a crime, wasn’t reasonable suspicion. Officers could ask questions, but they couldn’t hold him. A more detailed description, or other signs of a crime, can change the result.
Is walking away from police resisting arrest in Florida?
It can be. Resisting without violence under section 843.02 requires proof the officer was in the lawful execution of a legal duty. If the detention was lawful, walking away can be a crime. If it wasn’t, as in Holliday, that element fails. Force is a different matter under sections 843.01 and 776.051.
Did the 2026 resisting law change affect this?
Not for resisting without violence. Chapter 2026-144 removed the lawful-duty wording from section 843.01, the felony, effective June 16, 2026. Section 843.02, the misdemeanor, still requires the lawful execution of a legal duty.
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Further Reading
- Holliday v. State, No. 5D2024-1865 (Fla. 5th DCA Oct. 2, 2026), CourtListener
- Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1992), CourtListener
- Fla. Stat. 843.02, resisting officer without violence, Online Sunshine
- Fla. Stat. 843.01, resisting with violence, Online Sunshine
- Fla. Stat. 776.051, force in resisting arrest or detention, Online Sunshine
- CS/SB 156 (2026), the Officer Jason Raynor Act, Florida Senate bill page, chapter 2026-144
WRITTEN AND REVIEWED BY
Rory Safir, ACS-CHAL Forensic Lawyer-Scientist
He is the author of The Florida DUI Trial Manual, an NHTSA-qualified instructor in the standardized field sobriety exercises, faculty of the National College for DUI Defense, and a former Assistant Public Defender in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit.
This post is general information about Florida law, not legal advice, and it does not create an attorney-client relationship. The decision discussed is Holliday v. State, No. 5D2024-1865 (Fla. 5th DCA Oct. 2, 2026), read in the slip opinion, which is not final until any timely rehearing motion is resolved, together with the decisions it quotes or cites, Tellam v. State, 373 So. 3d 345 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), Fields v. State, 292 So. 3d 889 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020), Baptiste v. State, 995 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 2008), Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), and R.E. v. State, 536 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), and Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1992), sections 843.01, 843.02 and 776.051, Florida Statutes (2026), and CS/SB 156 (2026), chapter 2026-144, Laws of Florida, as of October 6, 2026.
