In Brief
On October 15, 2026, the Florida Supreme Court ordered a new trial in a 2003 Brevard County murder case because the State never turned over a set of crime lab call logs. In them, a Florida Department of Law Enforcement analyst told the lead detective that the DNA transfer theory the State later argued to the jury “sounded highly unlikely,” and a month later, after she and her supervisor reviewed the data, the two of them told the detective the DNA was “more than likely a direct contact of some sort.” The court held that withholding the logs violated the rule of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the constitutional duty to disclose evidence that helps the defense. So does the State have to give you the lab’s notes? Brady sets the minimum: when something in the lab’s file helps the defense and it’s material, meaning there’s a reasonable probability it would have changed the verdict, the State has to disclose it, even if only the police knew about it. Florida’s discovery rule goes further: once the defense opts into discovery, the prosecutor has to disclose the lab’s reports and test results, and it doesn’t matter whether they help.
If a crime lab result is part of your case, the report you’ll get in discovery, the pretrial process where the State shares its evidence with the defense, is a summary. Behind it sit the data, the bench notes the analyst made while testing and, as this decision shows, records of what the analyst told the detective on the phone. In this case, the State’s own DNA analysts doubted the theory the State took to the jury, and the defense never got the log where they’d said so.
On This Page
What the Lab Told the Detective
In Jones v. State, No. SC2024-1135 (Fla. Oct. 15, 2026), the Florida Supreme Court reviewed the denial of a postconviction motion, which is the request a defendant files after losing the direct appeal to raise problems the trial record didn’t show. Henry Lee Jones had been convicted of and sentenced to death for a 2003 murder at a Melbourne motel (slip op. at 2). Page cites here are to the slip opinion, the version a court releases on the day it decides a case.
DNA from a woman who lived at the motel was found on a genital swab taken from the victim’s body (slip op. at 4-5). The Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) analyst who did the DNA testing discussed that result by phone with the lead detective and a crime scene investigator, and FDLE logged the calls. By the court’s description, each log records the date and time, who took part and “a detailed description of the discussion” (id. at 4-5 n.2).
In a July 2012 call, the detective and the crime scene investigator told the analyst they believed the woman’s DNA got there by “secondary transfer from the comforter, since the maids indicated that they often do not wash the comforters and will [switch] them from room to room” (slip op. at 5). Secondary transfer means DNA that travels indirectly, here from one person to a comforter and from the comforter to someone else. The analyst told them the theory “sounded highly unlikely” (id.).
The next month, after the analyst and her FDLE supervisor had both reviewed the data for the swab, she contacted the detective again. The log records that they “both agree that it is highly unlikely” the DNA came from a comforter in another room, and that “[i]t is more than likely a direct contact of some sort” (slip op. at 5).
The State had these records “over a year before” the trial began and “did not produce them in discovery” (slip op. at 6). In April 2013, months before trial, the public defender deposed the lead detective, meaning questioned her under oath outside of court, and asked whether she’d had any conversations with FDLE about the DNA. Her answer included that “the comforters were not being cleaned.” The court wrote that “[a]t no point” did she give “any indication” that she’d spoken with FDLE or that FDLE had told her the transfer theory was highly unlikely, and that her answer “actually advanced the secondary transfer theory” (id. at 6, 12).
What the Jury Heard Instead
At trial, the State advanced the transfer theory, and it didn’t call any FDLE analyst to testify on the subject (slip op. at 6-7). A motel housekeeper said the comforters weren’t always washed and that “it could be possible” for body fluids from one guest to reach another. The State’s medical examiner called transfer by the comforter “quite possible,” and a detective testified that the DNA could have gotten there the same way. The woman testified that she’d never met or seen the victim (id. at 6).
In closing, the State told the jury there was “nothing suspicious” about the DNA and that it was “entirely explainable” by transfer from an unwashed comforter. It called transfer the “innocent explanation” (slip op. at 7).
The firm’s page on DNA and serology defense in Florida explains secondary transfer as the way a person’s DNA can end up somewhere they never were. Here the State made the transfer argument, to account for someone else’s DNA, and the lab that did the testing had already told the detective it was highly unlikely. The jury weighed that argument without hearing what the lab thought of it.
What Brady Requires
The rule comes from Brady, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution” (373 U.S. at 87). Suppression means the prosecution didn’t turn the evidence over. Due process is the Constitution’s guarantee of a fair proceeding, and the Florida Supreme Court described this duty as one “grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment” (Jones, slip op. at 8). And the defense doesn’t have to ask. The Court later held that the duty applies “even though there has been no request by the accused.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999).
Exculpatory evidence tends to show the accused didn’t commit the crime. Impeachment evidence gives the jury a reason to doubt a witness. Brady covers both. In Strickler, the Court broke a violation into three parts: “The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued” (527 U.S. at 281-82). Prejudice, in Brady terms, means the missing evidence could have changed the result, and the Florida Supreme Court treats it as the same question as materiality (Jones, slip op. at 8, 12). That court uses the same three parts, and it’s the defendant’s burden to prove each one (id. at 8).
Intent doesn’t matter. Brady applies “irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution,” and Strickler covers evidence suppressed “either willfully or inadvertently.” The duty also doesn’t stop at the prosecutor’s own file. In Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995), the Court said “the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.” The Florida Supreme Court applies the same rule. Rogers v. State, 782 So. 2d 373, 378 (Fla. 2001).
Florida’s discovery rule has its own version of the duty. Under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(b)(4), “[a]s soon as practicable after the filing of the charging document the prosecutor must disclose to the defendant any material information within the state’s possession or control that tends to negate the guilt of the defendant as to any offense charged.” The charging document is the paper that formally accuses a person of the crime, and the rule says the duty applies whether or not the defense has discovery obligations of its own. The firm’s page on legal defenses in Florida criminal cases lists discovery violations and Brady among the procedural defenses.
How the Court Applied It
Chief Justice Couriel wrote for the majority, which held that “[t]he State violated the Brady rule when it withheld this evidence, as it would have provided a substantial basis for impeachment of the State’s witnesses, and Jones was prejudiced by his not having received it” (slip op. at 9).
The logs were favorable. They “could have been used to impeach several of the State’s witnesses, and to attack the rigor of the State’s investigation” (slip op. at 10). The medical examiner and a detective had told the jury that transfer was a viable explanation, and “[t]he call logs show that FDLE analysts had concluded just the opposite” (id.). The court added that the logs could have been used to challenge the woman’s testimony that she’d never seen the victim, and “to attack the quality and thoroughness of the State’s investigation” (id.).
The State suppressed them. The postconviction court found the State withheld the logs “either willfully or inadvertently,” and on appeal the State didn’t contest the point (slip op. at 7, 11). The court said that “[a]t the very least” the lead detective knew the analysts had concluded the transfer theory was highly unlikely, “thus triggering the State’s Brady obligations,” and that the defense “did not have access to the call logs” (id. at 11-12). The court didn’t decide whether anyone meant to keep the logs back. Under Brady, it didn’t need to.
And the logs were material. In Brady terms, that means there’s a reasonable probability the verdict would have been different had the defense been able to use the evidence (slip op. at 12-13). The court explained that this doesn’t require showing a different verdict was more likely than not, only that the chance of one is great enough to undermine confidence in the outcome (id. at 13).
The court found that the logs “would have materially enhanced” the defense’s ability to contest the medical examiner’s and the detective’s testimony on transfer, which the State relied on in closing (id. at 14). It also said the logs could have been used to question the woman’s testimony that she’d never met the victim, to show she was with him near the time of the murder, and to answer the State’s presentation of the case as “a sexually charged crime” (id. at 14-15). The majority weighed these points together. It acknowledged that the State’s case rested mainly on other evidence, but it found that the State had advanced the transfer theory “as a central component of its case” (id. at 16). “The withheld evidence was material, and Jones was prejudiced” (id.).
The court reversed the denial of the postconviction motion, directed that the conviction be set aside and remanded the case “for a new trial” (slip op. at 17), meaning it sent the case back to the trial court to be tried again. It called Jones’s three other claims moot, meaning they didn’t need a decision anymore, and didn’t reach them (id. at 1, 16-17). It didn’t make any finding on guilt or innocence.
The Dissent, and What Is Still Open
The vote was 5 to 2, with Justices Labarga, Muñiz, Grosshans and Francis joining the chief justice. Justice Barrios dissented, joined by Justice Tanenbaum. The dissent’s analysis focused on materiality. Justice Barrios wrote that “even if the call logs constituted impeaching and/or exculpatory evidence, the evidence was not material within the meaning of Brady” (slip op. at 17). In the dissent’s view, the transfer theory “can hardly be considered central to the case,” and “the evidence against Jones was overwhelming” (id. at 18, 22). The dissent also didn’t think any of Jones’s other claims had merit (id. at 22).
In a footnote, the dissent said it found “compelling” the postconviction court’s conclusion that the logs weren’t exculpatory. It also pointed out that the analyst said transfer was highly unlikely, not impossible: “She did not state that it was impossible for it to ever occur” (slip op. at 17 n.4). That’s a fair limit on what the logs show. They record two analysts’ assessment, and they don’t say transfer was ruled out. The majority’s concern was that the defense never got to put that assessment in front of the jury.
The same footnote said Jones’s postconviction motion hadn’t described the logs as impeachment evidence for Brady purposes, which in the dissent’s view left that argument unpreserved, meaning not properly raised in the trial court (slip op. at 17 n.4). The majority opinion doesn’t address that point. As of October 25, 2026, the decision isn’t final. The opinion says it won’t be until the time to file a rehearing motion runs out and any motion that’s filed is decided (id. at 17). A rehearing motion asks the same court to take another look.
Does the State Have to Give You the Lab’s Notes?
Brady sets the minimum. When something in the lab’s file is favorable to the defense and material, the State has to disclose it, and the duty reaches what the police know even when the prosecutor doesn’t.
Florida’s discovery rule goes further. Once the defense files a Notice of Discovery, the filing that opts a defendant into Florida’s discovery process, the prosecutor has 15 days to disclose the reports or statements of forensic analysts and other scientific witnesses made in connection with the case, including the results of “scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons” (Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220(b)(1)(J)). The prosecutor also has to disclose the statements of the people on the State’s witness list, and the rule counts as a statement one “summarized in any writing or recording” (Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220(b)(1)(B)). Those duties don’t depend on whether the material helps the defense. Filing the notice also brings reciprocal discovery obligations, meaning the defense has to share certain things with the State too (Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220(a)).
The rule doesn’t reach everything. Its definition of a statement covers police and investigative reports, but it doesn’t include “the notes from which those reports are compiled” (Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220(b)(1)(B)). Brady’s materiality test also looks to the verdict at trial, and the U.S. Supreme Court has held that “the Constitution does not require the Government to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant.” United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002). In Florida, it’s the discovery process under Rule 3.220 that lets the defense get that kind of material before deciding on a plea. So in a case with a lab result, a defense lawyer asks early, and in writing, for these things.
The lab’s whole file, not the one-page report. That’s the analyst’s bench notes and the data behind the result. The firm’s page on Florida forensic science defense walks through that request.
The lab’s communication records. This covers call logs, conversation logs, emails and notes of calls between the analysts and the detectives. In Jones, the analysts’ doubts were recorded in a log of phone calls.
The records, and not only the witness. The defense in Jones asked the lead detective at deposition about her conversations with FDLE, and the court wrote that her answer didn’t give “any indication” that FDLE had assessed the transfer theory as highly unlikely (slip op. at 12). A deposition helps, but it doesn’t replace the documents.
What the lab thinks of the State’s theory. In Jones, the State’s case for transfer came from a housekeeper, a medical examiner and a detective, and no FDLE analyst testified about it (slip op. at 6-7). When the State’s scientific point comes from someone other than the lab that did the testing, a defense lawyer can ask what the lab said.
Records about the analyst. The firm’s earlier post on a crime lab DNA analyst who got ten years for deleting results covers the analyst records the defense can ask for, including discipline and proficiency tests, which check an analyst’s work on samples with a known answer.
Jones was a DNA case in a murder trial, and the court didn’t say anything about DUI cases or blood and breath testing. But Brady’s words cover “evidence favorable to an accused,” and Florida’s criminal rules, discovery included, govern “all criminal proceedings in state courts,” including criminal traffic offenses (Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.010). So a defense lawyer can make the same requests of the lab in a DUI blood case. Jones didn’t decide that. The firm’s page on lab accreditation and what discovery reveals lists the accreditation and quality records the firm asks for. If a case is already over and a record like this turns up afterward, the page on postconviction relief and writs covers how those motions work in Florida.
If there’s a lab result in your case, ask your lawyer whether the lab’s full file and its communication records have been requested, and what came back. The analysts’ doubts in Jones sat in a call log for more than a year before trial. The State had to disclose that log whether or not anyone asked for it, and a written request that names the lab’s communication records makes it harder for one like it to stay in a file.
Common Questions
Does the State have to give the defense the crime lab’s notes in Florida?
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), sets the minimum. When something in the lab’s file is favorable to the defense and material, the prosecution has to disclose it, and under Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995), it doesn’t matter if only the police knew about it. Florida’s discovery rule goes further. Once the defense files a Notice of Discovery, the prosecutor has to disclose the reports of the State’s scientific witnesses, including test results, and the statements of the people on the State’s witness list, even when they don’t help the defense (Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220(b)(1)(B), (J)). Rule 3.220(b)(4) also requires disclosure of material information that tends to negate guilt. In Jones v. State, No. SC2024-1135 (Fla. Oct. 15, 2026), the Florida Supreme Court ordered a new trial after the State withheld FDLE call logs.
What is a Brady violation?
It’s the prosecution’s failure to disclose evidence favorable to the accused that’s material to guilt or punishment. In Florida, the defendant has to show that the evidence was exculpatory or impeaching, that the State suppressed it, willfully or inadvertently, and that it was material, so the defendant was prejudiced. Good faith doesn’t excuse it, and the duty applies even if the defense didn’t ask for the evidence.
What is secondary DNA transfer?
It’s DNA that travels indirectly, from a person to an object and from the object to someone else. In Jones, the State argued a woman’s DNA reached the victim through a motel comforter, and FDLE analysts had told the lead detective that was highly unlikely.
Does it matter if the prosecutor didn’t know about the evidence?
No. It’s the prosecutor’s duty to learn of favorable evidence known to others acting for the government, including the police. In Jones, the court said that, at the very least, the lead detective knew of the analysts’ conclusion, and that triggered the State’s Brady obligations.
Does a Brady violation get the case dismissed?
It didn’t in Jones. The Florida Supreme Court directed that the conviction be set aside and remanded the case for a new trial. It didn’t make any finding on guilt or innocence.
Is the Jones decision final?
As of October 25, 2026, no. The opinion says it isn’t final until the time to file a rehearing motion expires and any motion that’s filed is decided.
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Further Reading
- Jones v. State, No. SC2024-1135 (Fla. Oct. 15, 2026)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995)
- Rogers v. State, 782 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 2001)
- United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002)
- Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, including Rules 3.010 and 3.220, The Florida Bar, October 1, 2026 edition
- Florida Supreme Court orders new trial for death-row inmate after 2003 Brevard murder, WKMG News 6, October 16, 2026
WRITTEN AND REVIEWED BY
Rory Safir, ACS-CHAL Forensic Lawyer-Scientist
He is the author of The Florida DUI Trial Manual, an NHTSA-qualified instructor in the standardized field sobriety exercises, faculty of the National College for DUI Defense, and a former Assistant Public Defender in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit.
This post is general information about Florida law, not legal advice, and it does not create an attorney-client relationship. The authorities discussed are the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion in Jones v. State, No. SC2024-1135 (Fla. Oct. 15, 2026), which is not final until the time to file a rehearing motion expires and any motion filed is decided; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995); Rogers v. State, 782 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 2001); United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002); and Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.010 and 3.220, as of October 25, 2026. The court ordered a new trial and made no finding on guilt or innocence. Every case turns on its own facts, and past results do not guarantee a similar outcome.
