Stopped for Weaving in Tampa Bay? A New Ruling Splits Florida on DUI Stops

Drifting over a lane line was a stated reason for the stop in every case discussed below. In the appeals districts that cover Orange and Polk counties, a few drifts across that line can be enough to justify the stop. In Tampa Bay they usually aren’t, unless the driving created a safety concern, and an appeals court reaffirmed that rule on October 30 while certifying the conflict to the Florida Supreme Court.

For anyone arrested for DUI after a stop for weaving, the difference can decide the whole case. When a court finds a stop unlawful, the evidence gathered after it can be suppressed, which is what the trial court did in this one.

The Stop on State Road 64

According to the concurring opinion in Dunlop, a Manatee County sheriff’s deputy saw a truck on State Road 64 around midnight. The deputy watched it swerve three to four times within the lines of its lane, then swerve into the shoulder three to four more times. Once, the deputy testified, the truck was “about half-way into the shoulder.” The deputy wasn’t sure whether the driver was tired or intoxicated and made a traffic stop.

The State charged the driver with DUI and with failing to obey driver license restrictions. The trial court granted a motion to suppress. It found the driver was not driving in a rapid, slow, erratic or aggressive manner, did not interfere with other traffic, and did not present a danger to the motoring public, so the movements in and out of the lane did not justify a stop.

The State appealed, relying on the lane statute as the basis for the stop. The Second District affirmed in a short per curiam opinion, quoting its decision in Peterson v. State, 264 So. 3d 1183 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019): the court “has refused to find a violation of [section 316.089(1), Florida Statutes (2015),] where a driver’s failure to maintain a single lane did not endanger himself or herself or anyone else.”

What the Lane Statute Says

Section 316.089(1), Florida Statutes, applies on roads divided into two or more clearly marked lanes. It reads in full: “A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.” A violation is a noncriminal moving violation under subsection (5).

The whole fight is over how those two clauses fit together. One reading treats the safety language as part of every violation, so drifting out of a lane breaks the law only when it is unsafe. The other reading splits the sentence in two: staying in your lane “as nearly as practicable” is one duty, checking for safety before you change lanes is another, and failing the first is a violation whether or not anyone was nearby.

Three Appeals Courts, Two Answers

The Second District has read the statute the first way since Crooks v. State, 710 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), which held that a violation “requires evidence that the driver’s conduct created a reasonable safety concern.” In Peterson, decided in 2019, a DeSoto County deputy stopped a driver who crossed the solid white line twice in a mile and a half. The deputy admitted there was no oncoming traffic, no one in the bike lanes, no pedestrians affected, and no assumption that the driver was impaired. The court held there was no basis for a stop under the lane statute, ordered the motions to suppress granted, and vacated the convictions.

The Fifth District went the other way in State v. Howard, No. 5D2024-0176 (Fla. 5th DCA May 9, 2025), a Seminole County DUI case. An officer testified that the car was driven between the center and right lanes for at least 15 seconds and kept that path into an intersection. Relying on its own earlier precedent, the court held that a stop is valid “irrespective of whether anyone is endangered” when a driver deviates from the lane by more than is practicable, and reversed the suppression order.

The Sixth District sided with the Fifth in Ramos Perez v. State, No. 6D2024-0758 (Fla. 6th DCA July 24, 2026), an Orange County case where a detective saw a car leave its lane toward the median twice. “After thoughtfully considering both opinions, we agree with Howard,” the court wrote, and it certified a conflict with Peterson.

In Dunlop, the Second District certified its decision to be in direct conflict with both Ramos Perez and Howard. Under article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution, the Florida Supreme Court “may review” a district court decision certified to be in direct conflict with another district’s. That review is discretionary, so the court decides whether to take the case.

The Chief Judge Who Agreed Only With the Result

Chief Judge Lucas concurred in the result only, and his opinion is the reason I wouldn’t treat the Tampa Bay rule as settled. He agreed the court had to affirm “because we are still bound to follow Crooks and its progeny.” He then wrote that Crooks “put an improper gloss” on the statute by borrowing the safety requirement from a Florida Supreme Court decision about a different statute, the turn signal law in section 316.155.

In his reading, the first clause of section 316.089(1) “stands on its own,” and only the lane change clause mentions anyone’s safety. He called the Fifth District’s construction “the better construction” and wrote that on a clean slate he would align the Second District with it.

That is the chief judge of the Second District writing, in a signed opinion, that his own court’s rule misreads the statute. If the Supreme Court takes the conflict and adopts his reading, the safety requirement drivers in Tampa Bay rely on today would no longer be the law anywhere in Florida.

What the Split Means County by County

A Florida trial court follows the appeals court for its own district. As the Fifth District put it in Howard, quoting the Florida Supreme Court, if that district “has decided the issue, the trial court is bound to follow it.” So the answer to whether drifting over the line was enough depends on the county.

• Pinellas, Pasco, Hillsborough, Manatee, Sarasota and DeSoto counties sit in the Second District. Crooks, Peterson and now Dunlop control there: crossing the line without a reasonable safety concern does not violate section 316.089(1).
• Polk, Hardee and Highlands counties make up the Tenth Judicial Circuit, which belongs to the Sixth District. Ramos Perez controls there, and leaving the lane by more than is practicable can be enough on its own.
• Orange County, where Ramos Perez arose, is in the Sixth District. Seminole County, where Howard arose, is in the Fifth.

Two drivers who drift over the fog line the same way, one in Pinellas County and one in Polk County, can face opposite answers to the first question in their cases.

What the Ruling Doesn’t Do

Dunlop is about one justification for a stop, the lane statute, and the State built its appeal on that statute. It does not mean every weaving stop in Tampa Bay is unlawful.

• An officer can still stop a driver whose driving suggests impairment. Peterson itself says a failure to maintain a single lane, “coupled with a suspicion of impairment, unfitness, or vehicle defects,” can justify a stop, and it contrasted a case where a deputy watched a driver hold low speeds, drift across the line again and again, and jerk the vehicle back.
• A separate traffic violation can carry the stop by itself. In Ramos Perez, the court also upheld the stop because the driver was speeding.
• The officer’s real motive doesn’t matter. A stop is judged on what an objectively reasonable officer could have seen, so the question is what the driving showed, not why the officer was following the car.
• Safety is judged on the facts of each stop. Other cars close by, a person on the shoulder, or oncoming traffic are the kinds of facts the State points to when it argues the driving created a safety concern.

That is why the details of the driving matter so much: how many times, how far over the line, for how long, what else was on the road, and what the officer said at the time about impairment.

If You Were Stopped for Weaving in Tampa Bay

If the arrest report says you were stopped for failing to maintain a single lane, the stop itself is the first thing I look at.

• Get the exact wording of the stated reason for the stop. In Ramos Perez, the probable cause affidavit cited section 316.089 by number. The stated reason tells you which justification the officer chose.
• Get the dash camera and body camera video. The video shows how far the car drifted, how often, and whether any other car, cyclist or pedestrian was anywhere near it, and it can contradict a report written hours later.
• Find out what the officer said about impairment before the stop. In Peterson, the deputy’s admission that he did not assume the driver was impaired removed the fallback justification. In Dunlop, the deputy stated he wasn’t sure whether the driver was tired or intoxicated.
• Write down the road, the time, the weather and the traffic while you still remember them. Lane markings, road work and wind all affect what “as nearly as practicable” means on a given night.
• Keep in mind that the rule could change. If the Florida Supreme Court accepts the conflict, a weaving case in Tampa Bay may turn on how that court reads the statute.

My page on the traffic stop in a Florida DUI case covers the other ways a stop gets challenged, and my page on reasonable suspicion explains the standard for an investigatory stop. I defend DUI cases in St. Petersburg and across Tampa Bay, and a strategy session is where we go through the report and the video together.

Common Questions

Can police pull you over for weaving in Florida?

It depends on where you were stopped and what the weaving looked like. In the Second District, which covers Pinellas, Pasco, Hillsborough, Manatee, Sarasota and DeSoto counties, leaving your lane violates section 316.089(1) only when it creates a reasonable safety concern. The Fifth and Sixth Districts hold that leaving the lane by more than is practicable is a violation even if no one is endangered. In the Second District too, driving that suggests impairment can still justify a stop.

What did the court decide in State v. Dunlop?

On October 30, 2026, the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed an order suppressing evidence in a Manatee County DUI case where a deputy stopped a truck for swerving within its lane and onto the shoulder. The court followed its earlier cases requiring a reasonable safety concern for a lane violation and certified a direct conflict with the Fifth and Sixth Districts.

Is failure to maintain a single lane a crime in Florida?

No. Section 316.089(5) makes a violation a noncriminal traffic infraction, punished as a moving violation. Its importance in a DUI case is that it is often the officer’s stated reason for the stop that led to the arrest.

Will the Florida Supreme Court decide the weaving question?

It may. A decision certified to be in direct conflict with another district gives the Florida Supreme Court discretionary jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution. The court decides whether to accept the case.

If my stop was illegal, does my DUI case get dismissed?

Not automatically. The remedy is a motion to suppress the evidence that came from the stop. In many DUI cases that evidence is the officer’s observations, the field sobriety exercises and the breath or blood result, so a granted motion can leave the State without the evidence it needs.

Further Reading

The sources behind this post, so you can read what I read.

1. State v. Dunlop, No. 2D2025-1506 (Fla. 2d DCA Oct. 30, 2026)
2. Ramos Perez v. State, No. 6D2024-0758 (Fla. 6th DCA July 24, 2026)
3. State v. Howard, No. 5D2024-0176 (Fla. 5th DCA May 9, 2025)
4. Peterson v. State, 264 So. 3d 1183 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019)
5. Section 316.089, Florida Statutes
6. Florida Constitution, article V, section 3
7. Second District Court of Appeal

This post is general information about the law, not legal advice, and it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Anyone charged in the cases discussed is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty. Past results do not guarantee a similar outcome. The law discussed is section 316.089, Florida Statutes (2026), article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution, State v. Dunlop, No. 2D2025-1506 (Fla. 2d DCA Oct. 30, 2026), Ramos Perez v. State, No. 6D2024-0758 (Fla. 6th DCA July 24, 2026), State v. Howard, No. 5D2024-0176 (Fla. 5th DCA May 9, 2025), Peterson v. State, 264 So. 3d 1183 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019), and Crooks v. State, 710 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), as of November 7, 2026. The Dunlop, Ramos Perez and Howard opinions are subject to revision before official publication.